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Chapter 1: The Subsidiarity Principle in the EU Treaties 
I. Introduction 
The principle of subsidiarity raises ‘fundamental questions about the appropriate locus of 
political and legal authority within a complex and multiple-layered polity’.1 Specifically, 
subsidiarity addresses the issue of the exercise of competences in areas shared by Member 
States and the European Union.2 The purpose of the subsidiarity principle is ‘to arbitrate the 
tension between integration and proximity in all matters dealt with by the Union and its 
Member States’.3 As a ‘constitutional safeguard of federalism’, subsidiarity aims at restraining 
the exercise of powers allocated to the EU.4 In other words, subsidiarity decides whether, in a 
specific case in which the EU already has a competence, the EU should act or whether the 
action should be taken at the national level.5 
This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the ‘deliciously vague’ subsidiarity principle.6 
Section II describes the origin of the subsidiarity principle and its roots in German Basic Law. 
Section III discusses subsidiarity in Switzerland and the United States (US) as a principle 
connected to organisation of federal systems. Section IV then moves to the development of the 
subsidiarity principle within the EU legal order, first introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. This 
section elaborates on the guidelines that were established over time and the more recent focus 
on the procedural aspect of the principle. At this point, the relationship between the subsidiarity 
principle and the two other principles of Article 5(3) TEU are elaborated on. Section V then 
deals with the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle by the Court of Justice of the EU. 
Specifically, the limits and the recent trends in the Court’s case law are discussed together with 
the new ‘subsidiarity action’ introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The final section, Section VI, 
provides the context for the establishment of the Early Warning System (EWS): the problem 
of broadening of EU competence and the insufficient democratic legitimacy of EU policies. 
                                                 
1 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Re-appraising subsidiarity’s significance after Amsterdam’ Harvard Jean Monnet working 
paper series, 43 . 
2 Akos G Toth, ‘Is Subsidiarity Justiciable?’ (1994) 19 European Law Review 268, 269.  
3 Koen Lenaerts, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the 
Balance of Federalism’ (1993) 17 Fordham International Law Journal 846, 848. 
4 Robert Schütze, From dual to cooperative federalism: the changing structure of European law (Oxford 
University Press 2009) 247. 
5Akos G Toth, ‘The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 
1079, 1082. 
6 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The reformation of European constitutionalism’ (1997) 35 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 97, 127. 
II. Characteristics of the Subsidiarity Principle 
A. Origin of the Subsidiarity Principle  
Many scholars see the roots of the modern notion of subsidiarity in Pope Pius XI’s encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931).7 In the encyclical, the Pope offers a principle of social order which 
at its core can be read as an expression of the principle of subsidiarity:  
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own 
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the 
same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher 
association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity 
ought of its very nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy 
and absorb them.8 
Here we already find a preference for allocating responsibilities to the lower levels of 
organisation as long as these have the capability to exercise them effectively. This foreshadows 
the elements of subsidiarity in its modern use in the EU.  
Having said that, there are also important differences between the European and the 
Catholic versions of subsidiarity. First, the former is narrower because it concerns democratic 
public bodies, while the latter deals with much broader collective entities and society as a 
whole.9 Second, the EU subsidiarity principle can be viewed independently from the Catholic 
understanding. Even without Quadragesimo Anno, Europe might have arrived at a similar idea. 
Thus one can think of the EU subsidiarity principle as deriving from alternative political 
positions and not just from Catholic ideology.10  
Other roots of the subsidiarity idea can be traced back to two German traditions on the 
structure of the state: federalism and liberalism.11 The German federalist notion of the state 
focuses on the relationships between its different components and the functions they fulfil. 
Isensee finds in this tradition (eg, in the work of Althusius, von Humboldt, and Hegel) hints of 
                                                 
7 See for example Josef Isensee, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und Verfassungsrecht: eine Studie über das Regulativ des 
Verhältnisses von Staat und Gesellschaft (Duncker & Humblot 2001) 18ff. Deborah Z Cass, ‘The word that 
saves Maastricht? The principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers within the European Community’ 
(1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 1107, 1110.  
8 Quadragesimo Anno point 79, English translation available at http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-
xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno.html. 
9 Nicholas W Barber, ‘The limited modesty of subsidiarity’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 308, 310. 
10 Ibid. See also Isensee (n 7) 71. 
11 Isensee (n 7) 35. 
the idea of subsidiarity, without arguing for a direct expression of subsidiarity in this work.12 
More direct evidence for the presence of subsidiarity ideas as an organising principle can be 
found in the liberalist theory of the state. In the liberalist tradition, the state is legitimate only 
to the extent that it is organised according to the subsidiarity principle.13 Nevertheless, the 
liberalist perspective arguably knows only the individual and the state and, as such, does not 
speak to intermediary levels of organisation.14 
B. Subsidiarity in the German Basic Law 
The German Basic Law does not explicitly refer to subsidiarity as a principle. However, there 
is a strong case that the spirit of the principle entered the German constitution from the 
country’s scholastic tradition and from there led to the inclusion of subsidiarity in EU law.  
At the time of the creation of the Basic Law in 1949, the political and legal environment 
was receptive to the notion of subsidiarity. Indeed, a reference to the principle of subsidiarity 
was included in the draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Convention at 
Herrenchiemsee in 1948, even though this reference was ultimately dropped.15 There are 
several reasons for the removal. First, the religious heritage of the concept may have worried 
the drafters.16 Second, some of the drafters may have been satisfied that Article 1 of the draft 
included a sufficient commitment against an overreaching state and thus believed that a further 
reference to subsidiarity was unnecessary at the time.17 
Likewise, the final text of the Basic Law approved in 1949 did not formally include the 
subsidiarity principle.18 However, this lack may be explained by the fact that the Basic Law 
was expected to be of a provisional nature, and thus the drafters may have steered clear of 
nascent legal concepts.19 Overall, it can be argued that the forces behind the Basic Law sought 
to establish an order based on an ethical individualism that is also found in the subsidiarity 
principle, purposefully distancing the new German state from the collectivist state of the recent 
past.20 
                                                 
12 Ibid (n 7) 37. 
13 Ibid (n 7) 45. 
14 Ibid (n 7) 46.  
15 Ibid (n 7) 143. 
16 Ibid (n 7) 143. 
17 Ibid (n 7) 143. 
18 Ibid (n 7) 145. 
19 Ibid (n 7) 145. 
20 Ibid (n 7) 146. 
Finally, the inherently federal structure of the German state under the new Basic Law 
strongly reflected the ideal of subsidiarity.21 The component Länder of the new federal state 
had an interest in limiting the powers of the federal level and were able to imprint this view on 
the constitution through their close involvement in its creation and approval.22 
Beyond indications that the drafters of the Basic Law may have been concerned with the 
notion of subsidiarity, there are also indications in the text of the constitution itself that support 
the case that the German Basic Law carried the subsidiarity principle from its religious roots 
toward modern times.23 Most fundamentally, the federal structure of the German state is 
explicitly build up from below. Article 30 of the Basic Law concerning the sovereignty of the 
Länder assigns all state powers to the Länder unless specifically provided for otherwise in the 
Basic Law. In addition, there is a positive limited enumeration of powers at the federal level 
(Article 73 of the Basic Law) and a list of conditions that determine whether the Länder or the 
federal state should act in a given area (Article 72 of the Basic Law). 
Initially, Article 72 of the Basic Law was drafted very broadly, requiring only that a law 
met certain conditions relating to ‘the uniformity of living conditions beyond the territory of 
any Land’ for the federal level to act. However, on judicial review, this notion was found to be 
nonjusticiable, because any given law could readily be drafted to meet this requirement.24 In 
its modern version, in force since 1994, Article 72(2) of the Basic Law states that in the field 
of concurrent legislative competences, the Federation should act ‘if and to the extent that the 
establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory or the 
maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national 
interest’. The newly added necessity clause requires the federal level to demonstrate a specific 
need to act for each new law. This amended provision echoes the subsidiarity principle and can 
be regarded as its first incorporation into constitutional law.25 Under the new version of Article 
72 of the Basic Law, the federal level has primacy in the exercise of competence shared with 
the Länder when the conditions of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law are fulfilled and the federal 
level decides to act. In that case, a matter is beyond the influence of the Länder.26 However, 
Article 72(2) of the Basic Law sets out the specific conditions that the federal government is 
                                                 
21 Ibid (n 7) 147. 
22 Ibid (n 7) 147. 
23 Ibid (n 7) 223ff. 
24 Ibid (n 7) 230. 
25 Ibid (n 7) 358. 
26 Ibid (n 7) 359 
required to meet for it to take action.27 In addition, the Länder remain a valid alternative to the 
federal level if they can achieve the relevant objectives themselves, individually or acting 
jointly.28 These two aspects of the German Basic Law are both reminiscent of counterparts in 
the implementation of the subsidiary principle in EU law. First, once the EU decides to act and 
meets the conditions to act under the subsidiarity principle, then the Member States can no 
longer regulate on their own. Second, there is no explicit requirement for the EU to act 
whenever the national level cannot achieve the objective sufficiently and where the objective 
would be better achieved at the EU level. 
There are certain limits to the expression of subsidiarity in Article 72(2) of the Basic Law. 
First, the Basic Law addresses only the division of powers between the federal and the state, 
ignoring, for example, municipalities and civic organisations.29 In contrast, the regional and 
local levels are explicitly recognised in the Lisbon Treaty as valid levels on which to exercise 
competences, highlighting the multi-layered nature of the national level itself.30 Second, Article 
72(4) of the Basic Law does not automatically return competences to the Länder if and when 
the conditions of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law are no longer fulfilled, but leaves this to the 
discretion of the federal level.31 This discretion is not included in the EU subsidiarity 
provisions. 
Article 72(2) of the Basic Law demands a dual test reviewing whether there is a case for 
federal legislation in addition to whether the legislation goes beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives set in that provision.32 The Basic Law foresees a judicial safeguard of 
the subsidiarity principle in the form of review by the Federal Constitutional Court on the 
application of the Bundesrat or a Land.33 In contrast, there is no political safeguard of 
subsidiarity. An initiative to give the Bundesrat the role as a parliamentary watchdog of the 
subsidiarity principle did not gain the necessary support.34 
                                                 
27 Ibid (n 7) 359. 
28 Ibid (n 7) 360. 
29 Ibid (n 7) 360. 
30 de Búrca (n 1) 16. 
31 Isensee (n 7) 360. 
32 Greg Taylor, ‘Germany: The subsidiarity principle’ 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law 115, 120. 
33 Article 93 (2a) of the Basic Law. This judicial safeguard did not exist before 1994 since both the German 
scholarship and the Federal Constitutional Court perceived Article 72(2) of the Basic Law as expressing a 
political decision of the federal legislator to legislate. See Markus Rau, ‘Subsidiarity and judicial review in 
German federalism: the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Geriatric Nursing Act Case’ 4 
German Law Journal 223, 227. 
34 Deutscher Bundestag, Bericht der Gemeinsamen Verfassungskommission, Drucksache 12/6000, 05.11.93, 33. 
There is by now a significant body of jurisprudence produced by the Federal Constitutional 
Court on the enforcement of the subsidiarity principle. Nonetheless, the Court’s interpretation 
of the tests involved in Article 72(2) of the Basic Law remains unclear, echoing some of the 
issues with the CJEU’s jurisprudence on subsidiarity. For example, no precise meaning has 
been given by the Court to the terms ‘equal living conditions’ or ‘national interest’.35 
Nonetheless, there are several cases in which the Court has found federal legislation 
incompatible with the subsidiarity principle, eg, in the ‘Junior Professors’ case.36 These 
decisions led to an amendment of Article 72(2) of the Basic Law in 2006 that restricted its 
applicability to a limited number of areas of concurrent competence,37 such as, for example, 
the residence of foreign nationals, public welfare, law relating to economic matters (mining, 
industry, trade, commerce, etc), and regulation of educational training or state liability. 
It is notable that after German law had served as inspiration for the EU’s inclusion of 
subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, the subsidiarity principle found its way back from EU 
law into German law. Specifically, according to Article 23 of the Basic Law adopted in 1992, 
Germany participates in the development of an EU ‘that is committed to democratic, social and 
federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a 
level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law’. 
Germany is thus reimporting the subsidiarity principle to the German constitutional system.38 
Article 23 of the Basic Law enumerates the subsidiarity principle and presents an 
important tie between German law and EU law. It regulates the way Germany acts within the 
EU, for example, requiring the representatives of Germany in the EU to adhere to the 
subsidiarity principle in both the division and the exercise of competences at the EU level.39 In 
addition, it commits Germany to an EU based on subsidiarity, reemphasising the importance 
of the principle for German constitutional law.40 The inclusion of subsidiarity in the EU treaties 
directs new attention to Germany’s own commitment to subsidiarity in the organization of the 
German federal state.41 
                                                 
35 Rau (n 33) 233. 
36 Greg Taylor, ‘Germany: A slow death for subsidiarity?’ 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 139, 
143. 
37 Ibid 146. 
38 Isensee (n 7) 334. 
39 Ibid (n 7) 371. 
40 Ibid (n 7) 371. 
41 Ibid (n 7) 334. 
III. Subsidiarity in Other Legal Systems 
Subsidiarity as an explicit constitutional principle has been ascribed a marginal role in 
federal constitutions.42 It is not explicitly written into the Australian, Brazilian, Canadian and 
US Constitutions.43 This has been explained by the existence of other means to deal with the 
question of which level of government does what such as the enumeration of powers.44 For 
example in Canada, the Constitution Act of 1867 provides a distribution of legislative 
competences between the federal and provincial governments, which includes a list of areas of 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal legislature and a list of areas of exclusive jurisdiction of 
provincial legislators, in addition to areas of joint jurisdiction.45 Nonetheless, the Canadian 
federal legislature can also legislate in areas not explicitly listed ‘for the peace, order and good 
government of Canada’ which can lead to excessive centralisation of power.46 The principle of 
subsidiarity is as such not enshrined in the text of the Constitution Act.47 Yet, as observed by 
one commentator, subsidiarity has been implicitly present in the case law of the Supreme Court 
of Canada, most visibly in a national concern doctrine and a provincial inability test.48 More 
recently subsidiarity was directly invoked by the Supreme Court of Canada as a constitutional 
principle linked to the balance of power of the two levels of government.49 The Canadian 
subsidiarity differs from the EU approach in various ways. Subsidiarity in Canada can apply 
in areas where the federal legislature has no explicit competence at all, while in the EU 
subsidiarity only applies in areas of shared competence. In Canada, subsidiarity works only 
upwards, meaning that it does not allow the transfer from the federal down to the provincial 
level; finally, the Canadian federal legislature is not obliged to proof the inability to act of the 
provinces. 
                                                 
42 Markus Jachtenfuchs and Nico Krisch, ‘Subsidiarity in global governance’ 79 Law & Contemp Probs 1, 10.  
For a comparative law perspective on subsidiarity see also Werner Vandenbruwaene, ‘The Judicial Enforcement 
of Subsidiarity. The comparative quest for an appropriate standard’ in Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and 
Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds), The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2013) 
43 Jachtenfuchs and Krisch. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Sections 91-95 of Canadian Constitution Act. 
46 Section 91 of Canadian Constitution Act. 
47 Eugénie Brouillet and Bruce Ryder, ‘Key Doctrines in Canadian Legal Federalism’ in The Oxford Handbook 
of the Canadian Constitution (2017) 425. 
48 Eugénie Brouillet, ‘Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open Pandora's Box?’ 
54 The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 601, 618. See also 
Andreas Follesdal and Victor Muñiz Fraticelli, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle in the 
EU and Canada’ 10 Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 89. 
49 Brouillet (n 48) 626-631. 
The following sections analyse the understanding of subsidiarity in the US and 
Switzerland, their enforcement and safeguards. Some comparisons are drawn with the 
approach to subsidiarity in the EU. 
A. Subsidiarity in Switzerland 
In Switzerland, subsidiarity is explicitly enshrined in the country’s constitution. The 
cantons exercise all powers of government except for those that are vested in the federation by 
the Constitution.50 The Swiss Constitution foresees that ‘[t]he principle of subsidiarity must be 
observed in the allocation and performance of state tasks’.51 The principle of subsidiarity, 
together with the principle of municipal autonomy, underscores the importance of subnational 
government in Switzerland.52 
While no safeguard procedure similar to the EWS has been introduced in Switzerland, 
other mechanisms are in force that might be seen as political safeguards of federalism.53 For 
example, representatives of the Cantons directly make up the Council of States, the Upper 
House of the Swiss Federal Assembly.54 In addition, the Swiss Federal Constitution requires a 
referendum for constitutional amendments, for the accession of Switzerland to international 
organisations, and for emergency federal acts that do not have a constitutional basis and that 
are valid for more than one year. Such a referendum requires a double majority of votes of both 
‘the People and cantons’ adding another layer of protection to the power of the lower unit of 
government.55 Furthermore, the cantons can directly petition for legislation and also block 
federal legislation if at least eight cantons support the effort. For example, in 2003, eleven 
cantons successfully triggered this mechanism against a proposed tax reform that reduced the 
tax revenues of cantons.56 Finally, while the Swiss Constitution does not provide for judicial 
review of the constitutionality of federal laws, such laws can be challenged in a referendum if 
at least 50,000 citizen petition for it.57  
                                                 
50 Art. 3 and 42 of Swiss Constitution. 
51 Art 5a of Swiss Constitution.  
52 Andreas Ladner, ‘Switzerland: Subsidiarity, Power‐Sharing, and Direct Democracy’, 201. 
53 On the interparliamentary cooperation in Switzerland see Katarzyna Granat, ‘National Parliaments as Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: Interparliamentary Cooperation in the EU, US and Switzerland’ in Davor Jančić (ed), 
National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis Resilience or Resignation? (Oxford 
University Press 2017) 273. 
54 Art 150 of the Swiss Constitution. 
55 Art 140(1) of the Swiss Constitution. The ‘double majority’ means the majority of the voters and the majority 
of 12 out of 23 votes (there are 26 cantons, but six of them count as half-cantons and have half a vote). 
56 Wolf Linder and Isabelle Steffen, ‘Swiss Confederation’ in Katy Le Roy and Cheryl Saunders (eds), 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Governance in Federal Countries (McGill-Queen's Press 2006) 308. 
57 Art 141 of the Swiss Constitution.  
B. Subsidiarity in the US 
Contrary to the Swiss Constitution, the subsidiarity principle is not explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution of the United States. Nonetheless, it can be argued that subsidiarity is ‘the 
key theoretical concept underlying a general theory of federalism’ and thereby a key part of 
the American experiment in form of the federal power principle.58 The ‘Virginia Plan’ drafted 
by Madison and put forward during the Constitutional Convention of 1787 framed the powers 
of the national government as ‘to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise 
of individual Legislation.’59 This phrasing recalls the notion of lower level insufficiency that 
underlies the application of the subsidiarity principle in the EU today. Despite this prominent 
inclusion in the early deliberations on the Constitution, the subsidiarity principle did not enter 
the final draft. It was instead replaced with the explicit enumeration of federal powers in Article 
I, Section 8. 
Despite its formal omission in the wording of the Constitution, there is an active debate 
surrounding whether and to what extent the subsidiarity principle operates in the US federal 
system. Bermann makes a powerful case for the view that subsidiarity is not being respected 
in the US as a procedural or jurisdictional principle. One part of his case rests on extent to 
which Congress is ‘limited in any significant way out of respect for the states’ capacity to 
accomplish the federal government’s general objectives’ in a field that falls within Congress’ 
remit.60 Here, it is concluded that while there are areas where Congress may leave for example 
the implementation of regulations to the states (‘cooperative federalism’), overall it has not 
developed structured adherence to the subsidiarity principle in practice.61 If the US Congress 
does not appear to apply the principle of subsidiarity in its legislative process, there may be 
space for the Supreme Court to enforce it. However, here it is underlined that the Court has 
‘denied itself a role in enforcing subsidiarity’ despite having possibly the tools to do so under 
the Interstate Commerce Clause.62  
In place of subsidiarity, the US system is seen to rely on the political process instead to 
protect the rights and interests of the states and lower levels of government. An influential view 
                                                 
58 Daniel Halberstam, ‘Federalism: Theory, Policy, Law’ in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 585. 
59 Max Farrand (ed), The records of the federal convention of 1787 (Yale University Press 1911) 20. 
60 George A Bermann, ‘Taking subsidiarity seriously: federalism in the European Community and the United 
States’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 331, 404. 
61 Ibid 416. 
62 Ibid 417. 
by Wechsler sees sufficient political safeguards in place in the US to protect the states’ 
interests.63 These consist of the following main elements: first, a ‘burden of persuasion on those 
urging national action’.64 Second, the States’ involvement in the federal government itself 
through elections of representatives in electoral districts formed within the states65 and the 
electoral college’s role in selecting the president.66 Third, the structure of the Senate which 
awards each State two senators arguably amplifies their power.67 Finally, due to the Electoral 
College Wechsler also sees the US president a necessarily ‘responsive to local values that have 
large support within the states’.68 The extent of these safeguards and their ability to constrain 
the federal government has been challenged but Wechsler’s main argument found its way into 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
case.69 
In addition to the structural safeguards described by Wechsler, legal and political 
scholarship has identified additional political safeguards of federalism in the role and 
incentives of political parties70 and in the importance of state level implementation of federal 
laws. The latter is illustrated in the extent to which the Affordable Care Act of 2010 was 
implemented to various degrees by the States allowing them to ‘limit or shape the federalization 
of government functions’.71 Finally, there are ‘informal political safeguards of federalism’ 
through which states can influence federal policy72, including for example through 
interparliamentary cooperation amongst the state legislatures.73 Overall, it is notable that 
                                                 
63 Herbert Wechsler, ‘The political safeguards of federalism: The role of the states in the composition and 
selection of the national government’ Columbia Law Review 543, 559. See a contrasting view claiming that 
judicial review is necessary to maintain and reinforce the political safeguards of federalism in Lynn A Baker, 
‘Putting the safeguards back into the political safeguards of federalism’ 46 Villanova Law Review 951. 
64 Wechsler (n 63) 545. 
65 Art I, Section 2 of the US Constitution and Clause 1 of 17th Amendment to the US Constitution. 
66 Art II, Section 1 of the US Constitution.  
67 Wechsler (n 63) 547. 
68 Ibid (n 63) 558. 
69 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S 528 (1985). See fn 11 of the judgement. 
However, the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, 
noted that Wechsler’s view of sufficient political safeguards did not reflect the current state of affairs. 
70 Larry D Kramer, ‘Putting the politics back into the political safeguards of federalism’ Columbia Law Review 
215, 278ff. See also Jenna Bednar, ‘The Robust Federation’ Cambridge University Press, 116. On political 
parties as political safeguards see also Shannon Jenkins and Douglas D Roscoe, ‘Parties as the political 
safeguards of federalism: The impact of local political party activity on national elections’ 44 Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 519, 537. 
71 Abbe R Gluck, ‘Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned 
Federalists' Gamble’ 81 Fordham L Rev 1749, 1768. 
72 John D Nugent, ‘The Informal Political Safeguards of Federalism’ (Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago,Ill, April 27-30, 2000) 6. This notion is further elaborated on in John D Nugent, Safeguarding 
federalism: How states protect their interests in national policymaking (University of Oklahoma Press 2012) 
54ff. 
73 Granat (n 53) 269. 
‘federal law [is] the exception and not the rule. […] many areas of law remain mostly at the 
state level, even after 220 years of American federalism.’74  
In contrast to Bermann and others who see no application of subsidiarity in the US and 
focus on political safeguards of states’ rights, other scholars perceive the subsidiarity principle 
as an organizing principle that plays an active role in the US. These scholars argue that the US 
system has been infused with subsidiarity considerations from the beginning, and the case law 
of the US Supreme Court on Congress’s enumerated powers, the dormant Commerce Clause; 
intergovernmental immunities; pre-emption; federal jurisdiction suggests there is judicial 
enforcement of subsidiarity.75 For example, they point to new vigour in restraining the federal 
government since the 1990s embodied in the United States v. Lopez case in which the US 
Supreme Court struck down the federal Gun Free School Zones Act but allowed similar laws 
at state level, as well as some newer case law, such as National Federation of Independent 
Businesses v. Sebelius case, where the majority of the justices found that the individual mandate 
requiring that uninsured individuals buy health insurance was not a proper exercise of 
Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause. Together these cases indicate that the US 
Supreme Court can offer a safeguard for states through the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause under the Jones & Laughlin Steel doctrine that finds that 
Congress can act on intrastate activities only if these ‘substantially burdened interstate 
commerce’.76 It is however worth noting that these arguments tend to deal with questions of 
allocations of powers and how subsidiarity may guide such decisions. In the EU context, the 
application of the subsidiarity principle is restricted to such areas that fall in the arena of shared 
competences and thus focusses primarily on the exercise of powers.77  
IV. Subsidiarity in the EU Treaties 
A. Historical Development 
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 contained the first traces of the subsidiarity principle.78 Some of 
its provisions, especially Articles 100 and 235 EEC, concern the distribution and exercise of 
                                                 
74 Steven G. Calabresi and Lucy D. Bickford, ‘Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from U.S. 
Constitutional Law’ 55 Nomos 123, 138. 
75 Ibid 158. 
76 Ibid 149. 
77 Vicki C Jackson, ‘Subsidiarity, the Judicial Role, and the Warren Court's Contribution to the Revival of State 
Government’ 55 Nomos 190, 192. 
78 Lenaerts (n 3) 852. See also Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the principle of subsidiarity, 27.10.1992, SEC(92)1990 
competences between the Community and the Member States and explore possible approaches 
and criteria that are reminiscent of the later subsidiarity principle such as conditions setting out 
necessity for the EU to act.79 Moreover, directives issued under Article 189 EEC incorporated 
some aspects of subsidiarity: the Community level established the binding objective leaving to 
the Member States the choice of form and methods for their implementation.80 These 
provisions are marginal, however, and cannot really be seen as evidence of the subsidiarity 
principle in the Rome Treaty.81 
In 1984, an early draft proposal for an EU treaty (the ‘Spinelli draft’) adopted by the EP 
included a concept of the subsidiarity principle. Specifically, in cases of concurrent 
competence, the EU was to ‘carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively 
in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose execution 
requires action by the Union because their dimension or effects extend beyond national 
frontiers’.82 
The idea of subsidiarity was first introduced in the Treaty text by the Single European Act 
of 1987, where it concerned Community action in the area of environmental policy and limited 
Community action in that field to cases in which the objectives of the policy can be better 
achieved at the Community level than at the level of individual Member States.83 However, the 
application of subsidiarity in the field of environmental policy has been questioned since this 
area especially demanded action at the EU or international level.84  
A number of reasons spoke in favour of the introduction of the subsidiarity principle in 
the EU. First, subsidiarity was seen as a response to the lack of a clear division of different 
types of competence in the treaties.85 The second reason built upon the first: in the uneasy cases 
of deciding upon the limits of EU powers, subsidiarity was perceived as a complementary 
criterion of ‘better’ achieving the objective.86 Third, the aim of subsidiarity was to prevent 
‘excessive centralisation’ occurring through treaty amendments, jurisprudence, and 
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harmonization.87 Finally, subsidiarity was supposed to boost ‘pluralism and the diversity of 
national values’.88 
The Maastricht Treaty, in Article 3b EC,89 as first provided the fully-fledged formulation 
of the subsidiarity principle:  
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. 
Subsidiarity became a general principle applicable to all policy areas of the treaty outside of 
the exclusive competence of the Community.90 In addition, the Maastricht Treaty articulated a 
democratic angle of the subsidiarity principle, by referring in the preamble and Article A TEU 
to taking decisions ‘as closely as possible to the citizen’.91 
The principle of subsidiarity was greeted as ‘an important, if undervalued’ part of the 
relation between Community and Member States and a form of division of power between 
them.92 However, at the same time it was seen as a step back, weakening the Community and 
slowing down European integration.93 Although it was said that even without subsidiarity, ‘one 
could [also] have lived quite happily and in peace in the European home’, subsidiarity remained 
a constitutional principle of EU law. 94 
The Maastricht formulation of the subsidiarity principle became the basis for its wording 
in the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty and of today’s subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty.95 The 
current Article 5(3) TEUreads as follows: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
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action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level (emphasis added). 
There is also a new subparagraph: 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National 
Parliaments ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the 
procedure set out in that Protocol.  
This new paragraph and the difference it makes for the application of the subsidiarity principle 
for EU institutions is discussed separately in Chapter 2. Besides this addition of the EWS into 
the text of Article 5(3) TEU, two differences between the Maastricht and the Lisbon 
subsidiarity are visible: a substantive one and a textual one. In terms of substance, the new 
subsidiarity formula has an added value because of its reference to the sufficiency of national 
action at ‘central level or at regional and local level’. The Maastricht wording of the 
subsidiarity principle, by mentioning only the Community and Member State levels ‘[did] not 
reflect the philosophy of allowing smaller units to define or achieve their own ends’.96 
Regarding the textual change, the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty combined the 
two parts of the subsidiarity test: first, that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, and second, that they can therefore be better 
achieved by the Community. The Maastricht Treaty used the linking phrase ‘and can therefore’, 
whereas its Lisbon Treaty version uses the formula ‘but can rather’. How should this change 
thus be read? It has been suggested that ‘and can therefore’ in the Maastricht version implied 
that the negative criterion acted as an independent criterion of equal importance relative to the 
positive one.97 The Lisbon version ‘but can rather’ seems to imply a stronger causal connection 
between the two. Yet, as they are different tests, it is unclear how the ‘but’ can be read in any 
way other than ‘and’. The Edinburgh Declaration and the Amsterdam Protocol, discussed 
below, both state that Community action has to satisfy both limbs of the subsidiarity principle.98 
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B. Concepts of Subsidiarity 
Conceptually, one can distinguish between material and procedural subsidiarity.99 The latter 
concerns a number of procedural conditions that EU action needs to implement in order to be 
seen as compatible with the subsidiarity principle.100 The material dimension of subsidiarity 
can be verified from two angles inherent in the wording of Article 5(3) TEU: the national 
insufficiency test and the comparative efficiency test.101 Under the first test, the EU can act 
only when the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level. This 
concerns the inadequacy of means at a Member State’s disposal for achieving the objectives of 
the proposed action.102 The second test demands that the EU shall act if the objectives of the 
proposed action can rather ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level’. In other words, the EU should not act ‘unless it could better achieve 
the objectives of the proposed action’.103  
The tests have been labelled in various ways. One way of describing the components of 
material subsidiarity is as ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ criteria.104 The ‘negative criterion’ concerns 
the insufficiency of Member State action, whereas the ‘positive criterion’, to be checked only 
if the first is confirmed, implies a comparative cost–benefit analysis at the different levels of 
government (including the ‘null option’ of EU inaction).105 Other reading of Article 5(3) TEU 
indicates that insufficiency of national action refers to the ‘Member State’s sense of self-
government, and what it believes it can do itself. This goes to wider issues than legal 
effectiveness such as how far a measure forms part of a wider valued tradition’.106 The second 
test inherent in the subsidiarity principle is a ‘federal’ one: ‘whether one central measure would 
be more effective than twenty-eight different ones’.107  
The national insufficiency test asks whether an objective can be achieved sufficiently by 
the Member States. The question here is whether passing the test requires all, some, or only a 
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single Member State to be in a position to achieve the objective and whether this includes 
Member States’ operating jointly or only acting individually. One interpretation concludes that 
it needs to be checked whether the objective of the measure can be achieved through the 
unilateral action of a single, multiple, or all the Member States’ acting independently. 108 
Arguably smaller Member States may lack financial or other resources to achieve the objective 
sufficiently, and in such cases, limits on the autonomy of larger Member States in order to 
achieve an objective at the EU level could then be justified. 109 A different reading proposes 
that the EU can act if one or more Member States do not have adequate means. 110 In practice, 
the first interpretation appears to be consistent with the second one for many EU proposals. 
For example, the objective of the proposal on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at trial in criminal proceedings states 
as its objective ‘common minimum rules for certain aspects of the right to presumption of 
innocence’. 111 If a single Member State was unable to adopt these standards, the overall 
objective would be violated, and thus the proposal would pass the national insufficiency test. 
Another question is if the subsidiarity principle bars the EU from acting when Member 
States could achieve the objective by acting in a form of an intergovernmental cooperation. 
The textual interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty permitted the conclusion that the EU should 
not act in such a case; however, such an approach would not boost the process of EU 
integration.112 The Treaty of Lisbon abolished the three-pillar structure in favour of creating 
the EU, yet the intergovernmental method is maintained for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters in which Member 
States still possess significant powers. Enhanced cooperation can be undertaken only as ‘a last 
resort, when it has established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within 
a reasonable period by the Union as a whole’.113 Therefore, to answer the initial question of 
whether the EU should not act when Member States could proceed in a form that is binding 
only for a limited group of them, it seems that this is only a further possibility in cases allowed 
by the Treaty in which Member States could not agree in the Council.114  
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C. Guidelines for the Application of the Subsidiarity Principle 
Although the two tests inherent in the subsidiarity principle have not changed since the 
Maastricht Treaty, over time, EU institutions adopted a number of recommendations for the 
application of this principle. In December 1992, the European Council meeting in Edinburgh 
prepared guidelines for the implementation of the subsidiarity principle ‘to increase 
transparency and openness in the decision-making process of the Community’.115 Those 
guidelines were laid down in the ‘Overall Approach’ annexed to the European Council’s 
conclusions. Subsidiarity is labelled here as a ‘dynamic concept’ working both ways: to expand 
and restrict (or discontinue) Community action depending on the circumstances. 116 The 
‘Overall Approach’ provided that when addressing the subsidiarity question, ‘should the 
Community act?’, the Community action has to fulfil at least one of the following conditions. 
First, ‘the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by Member States’.117 Second, ‘actions by Member States alone or lack of 
Community action would conflict with the requirements of the Treaty . . . or would otherwise 
significantly damage Member States’ interests’. At this point, the ‘Overall Approach’ gives 
some examples of Treaty requirements that could be at stake: the need to correct distortion of 
competition, avoidance of disguised restrictions on trade, and strengthening of economic and 
social cohesion. The third guideline conditioned compliance with subsidiarity on the ‘clear 
benefits [of Community action] by reason of its scale or effects compared with action at the 
level of Member States’.118 Moreover, harmonisation of national laws was compliant with 
subsidiarity only when harmonisation was necessary to achieve a Treaty objective. A common 
position of the Member States in relations with third countries (countries outside the EU) as 
such could not justify a Community action. Finally, the ‘Overall Approach’ provided that the 
subsidiarity reasoning had to be ‘substantiated by qualitative or, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators’.119 
As a compromise between Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) (both supporters of 
accommodating subsidiarity in the treaties) on the one hand, and France together with some 
southern Member States (in favour of mentioning the subsidiarity principle only in the 
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preamble) on the other, Protocol No. 30 ‘on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality’ was added to the Amsterdam Treaty.120 The Amsterdam Protocol borrowed 
the idea of subsidiarity as a ‘dynamic concept’ from the Edinburgh Conclusions and restated 
that compliance with subsidiarity must be demonstrated by ‘qualitative or, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators’.121 In comparison, however, the ‘General Approach’ distinguished 
quite clearly among the three legal concepts within Article 3b EC: principles of attribution of 
power, subsidiarity, and proportionality. For example, it placed the provisions on the form of 
action (choosing directives over regulations and framework directives over detailed measures) 
and on the consideration of financial and administrative burdens in the legislative process under 
the proportionality principle (‘nature and extent of Community action’).122 The Amsterdam 
Protocol repeated that same recommendation, however, without a direct connection either to 
the subsidiarity or proportionality principle. In this way, the protocol created a link between 
the two principles.123 This linkage, or, rather, confusion of the two principles is visible in the 
practice of the EWS, in which some national parliaments see the choice of a regulation over a 
directive as a subsidiarity violation.  
The Amsterdam Protocol also provided guidelines on the subsidiarity principle, repeating 
almost exactly those enshrined in the ‘Overall Approach’:  
- The issue under consideration has trans-national aspects which cannot be satisfactorily 
regulated by action by Member States 
- Actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the 
requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid 
disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would 
otherwise significantly damage Member States’ interests 
- Action at the Community level would produce clear benefits by reason of its scale or 
effects compared with action at the level of the Member States124  
Yet, the Amsterdam Protocol did not indicate if the conditions for Community action had 
to be fulfilled cumulatively or if fulfilment of one of them, eg, the transnational character of 
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the action, suffices for the Community to act.125 In contrast, the ‘General Approach’ used an 
‘and/or’ connector between the guidelines, implying that fulfilment of one of the guidelines 
allows the Community to go forward with its proposal. The Amsterdam Protocol is therefore 
often seen as a mere extract of the central principles established in the Edinburgh ‘Overall 
Approach’;126 the guidelines ‘largely restate the broad political questions in open-ended terms, 
and do not provide strong legal criteria to answer them’.127 However, no new criteria were 
established in the following years, either by the protocols to the Lisbon Treaty or in the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (2016).128 It is the Amsterdam criteria to 
which the Commission129 and national parliaments still refer.130 
D. Procedural Subsidiarity 
Article 296(2) TFEU prescribes that EU legal acts have to state the reasons on which they are 
founded and refer to respective proposals, initiatives, recommendations, requests, or opinions 
as demanded by the Treaties. In this respect, the CJEU’s case law maintains that the statement 
of reasons for an EU measure must show ‘clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the author 
of the measure in question’ allowing concerned persons to learn the reasons for the measure 
and to enable the Court to review the measure, but it is not required for that statement to go 
into every relevant point of fact and law.131 Whether the obligation to provide a statement of 
reasons has been satisfied, this ‘must be assessed with reference not only to the wording of the 
measure but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in 
question’.132 Where a legislative act is reviewed for its compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle, the statement of reasons must make clear that the questions relevant to this principle 
were sufficiently considered.133 The purpose of the procedural subsidiarity is thus to ensure 
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that EU institutions undertake a ‘process’ to make sure that the material subsidiarity is 
implemented.134  
The Edinburgh ‘Overall Approach’ indicated that the compliance of a Community action 
with the subsidiarity principle had to be substantiated by ‘qualitative or, wherever possible 
quantitative indicators’.135 The Commission proposed that it will consult at the pre-legislative 
stage on whether the proposal is compatible with the subsidiarity principle.136 A recital of the 
proposal’s preamble would refer to the compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity, and the 
explanatory memorandum will provide more detail in this respect, when necessary.137 The 
Commission should also prepare an annual report on the observance of Article 3b EC in its 
activities to be debated in the EP. Indeed, the Commission drafted its first report on the 
subsidiarity principle in 1994, later replaced by broader reports on ‘Better Lawmaking’.138  
The Inter-institutional Agreement among the EP, the Council, and the Commission obliged 
the Commission to show in the proposal’s explanatory memorandum that the principle of 
subsidiarity was complied with, and the EP and the Council should complement the 
amendments of Commission proposals by a justification if such proposals contain a ‘more 
extensive or intensive’ Community action.139 The institutions obliged themselves, following 
their internal procedures, to check proposals continuously for subsidiarity violations. The 
agreement also provided that the EP will hold a public debate on the Commission’s annual 
subsidiarity report in the presence of the Commission and the Council. 
Despite the attempt to bring more clarity to the application of the subsidiarity principle, 
the Edinburgh Guidelines and the Inter-Institutional Agreement were perceived as ‘vague and 
only indicative’.140 Nonetheless, they represented an effort to make subsidiarity 
‘operational’.141  
The Amsterdam Protocol maintained all the obligations for the Commission when 
proposing legislation: wide consultations before proposing legislation; inclusion of subsidiarity 
justification in its proposals, where necessary in an explanatory memorandum; and 
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minimisation of financial or administrative burden for the Community and Member State 
authorities on different levels and making it proportional to the objective to be achieved.142 The 
Commission should also submit its annual report on Article 3b EC.143  
Article 5(3) TEU directs that EU institutions ‘apply the principle of subsidiarity’ as 
foreseen in Protocol No. 2 that establishes the conditions for the application of the subsidiarity 
principle. Protocol No. 2 merely repeats the obligations for draft legislative acts set already in 
the Amsterdam Protocol, namely, that before proposing legislation the Commission should 
conduct wide consultations.144 The legislative proposals require a justification on the 
subsidiarity compliance, including a statement on its financial impact and, in cases of 
directives, implications for national (and regional) rules.145 Moreover, legislative proposals 
should demonstrate with ‘qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators’ that the 
proposal’s objective can be better achieved at the EU level.146 Finally, legislative drafts should 
consider the need to minimise financial or administrative burden for the EU, national entities, 
and citizens. It should be commensurate with the sought objective.  
Over the years, a number of ways to justify the compatibility of Commission proposals 
with the principle of subsidiarity have been established: in the roadmaps or inception impact 
assessments prepared for major initiatives, in the impact assessments, in explanatory 
memoranda, and in recitals of the proposal’s preamble.147 The roadmaps and inception impact 
assessments (roadmaps for initiatives subject to an impact assessment) that describe the 
problem and the objectives of the EU action contain an initial justification with regard to the 
subsidiarity principle.148 
The explanatory memorandum accompanying a Commission proposal aims to explain it 
to other institutions and the public and is required for all legislative and non-legislative 
proposals for adoption by the Council or by the EP and the Council.149 Protocol No. 2 does not 
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refer to, as did the Amsterdam Protocol, justification of compliance of a proposal with the 
subsidiarity principle in explanatory memoranda ‘whenever necessary’.150 However, the 
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making requires a subsidiarity justification for 
each Commission legislative proposal.151  
The subsidiarity justification in explanatory memoranda was often seen as superficial, 
simply reiterating that the proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle.152 In 2015, under 
the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, the Commission obliged itself to improve explanatory 
memoranda accompanying each of its proposals.153 With regard to the subsidiarity principle, 
an explanatory memorandum should ‘explain the Union dimension of the problem’ and 
conduct both a ‘necessity test’ and ‘effectiveness test’.154 
Impact assessments, introduced in 2003, have been seen as a tool to assess compliance of 
EU legislation with the subsidiarity principle.155 The Commission is obliged to provide impact 
assessments for its legislative and non-legislative proposals, delegated acts, and implemented 
measures that are likely to have significant economic, environmental, or social effects.156 
Impact assessments deal with ‘the existence, scale and consequences of a problem and the 
question whether or not Union action is needed’.157 They discuss, using qualitative and 
quantitative indicators, broader issues such as short-term and long-term costs of EU action and 
its economic, environmental, and social impact.158 Impact assessments should also include 
when possible an assessment of lack of EU action (‘cost of non-Europe’) and the effect on 
competitiveness and the administrative burdens in such cases.159  
The Commission’s ‘Better Regulation’ guidelines provide that an impact assessment 
should verify whether EU action at stake is compatible with subsidiarity by studying whether 
the issue has transnational aspects that Member States cannot adequately address and whether, 
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comparatively, EU-level action would generate greater benefits because of its scale or 
effectiveness.160 The guidelines indicate that subsidiarity evaluation will likely take place a 
number of times and that the rationale of the impact assessment process is to check whether 
proceeding with EU action ‘would make sense’.161 The subsidiarity assessment should provide 
‘concrete arguments, specific to the issues being analysed and substantiated with qualitative, 
and where possible, quantitative evidence’.162 Impact assessments are drafted in English, with 
an executive summary prepared in all official EU languages.163 The EP insists, however, that 
the principle of multilingualism should apply to impact assessments relating to vital aspects of 
public and political opinion.164 
The Commission also prepared a ‘toolbox’ compiling information and guidance for EU 
policymakers on various stages of policy initiatives, including carrying out an impact 
assessment.165 Specifically, when assessing subsidiarity, policymakers should perform a 
‘necessity/relevance test’ and an ‘EU added value test’.166 The former should show the ‘Union 
relevance’ of the initiative at stake by taking into consideration the geographical scope, number 
of business or actors involved in the Member States, and the ‘level of economic damage’ and 
establish whether a significant cross-border problem is at stake. The latter test considers 
advantages and disadvantages from EU action in comparison to those resulting from regional 
or national action by public or private entities.167  
Finally, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, an independent group of Commission officials and 
outside experts, checks the quality of all impact assessments. The board issues 
recommendations relating to subsidiarity and added value justification of proposals among a 
number of aspects of draft impact assessments.168  
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Impact assessments have contributed to ‘taking subsidiarity seriously’ by the 
Commission.169 The increased use of the impact assessments in the pre-legislative phase has 
been seen as a ‘move towards proceduralization’ in the subsidiarity monitoring.170  
E. The Relationship Between the Principles of Article 5 TEU 
Beyond subsidiarity, Article 5 TEU encompasses the principles of conferral and 
proportionality. Broadly speaking, the principle of conferral governs the limits of Union 
competences, while subsidiarity and proportionality govern the use of those competences.171 
Specifically, the principle of conferral allows the EU to act only within the limits of 
competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the treaties to achieve their 
objectives.172 The principle of proportionality demands that EU action does not exceed what it 
necessary to achieve the treaties’ objectives and should be applied in line with Protocol No. 
2.173 The EU legal scholarship dealt especially with the understanding of the relationship with 
other principles of Article 5 TEU, a situation which has an impact on the issues that should be 
tested under Protocol No. 2.174 
The principle of conferral can be seen as a ‘pre-question’ demanded by a systematic 
interpretation of Article 5 TEU, a reason why competence and subsidiarity cannot be 
separated.175 The question of whether the EU has a nonexclusive competence to regulate a 
matter is seen by some as a ‘responsibility criterion’, the first step in the application of the 
subsidiarity principle.176 A contrary view posits that the Amsterdam Protocol provided for 
‘tangible contours’ to the concept of subsidiarity, allowing for its legal application as ‘a 
benchmark for the exercise of nonexclusive Community competences in specific cases’, in 
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addition to the Lisbon Treaty’s ‘emphasis on the task of separation of competences’.177 In this 
context, subsidiarity cannot settle the question of competence, even though the question might 
be related to the more general idea of subsidiarity.178 
Similarly, there are a number of views regarding the relationship between subsidiarity and 
proportionality. According to the one viewpoint, there is a clear difference between the 
questions asked by subsidiarity and proportionality. The latter asks whether the action at stake 
is necessary to achieve the objective and whether it goes further than what is necessary to 
achieve that objective, while the former question concerns the issue of which level should take 
a given action.179 Moreover, proportionality does not manifest subsidiarity because the Court 
applies proportionality throughout the treaty provisions, while subsidiarity concerns only those 
areas that do not fall into EU-exclusive competence.180 An opposite view talks about a ‘close 
relationship’181 or even ‘cannibalization’ of subsidiarity by the proportionality principle by 
tying the ‘who’ and ‘how’ questions together.182 Arguably the subsidiarity principle expressed 
in Article 5(3) TEU contains elements of the proportionality principle such as adequacy, 
necessity, and proportionality sensu stricto.183 Adequacy is expressed by the phrase ‘by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’, whereas the 
‘if’ and ‘in so far as’ in the subsidiarity formula enshrined necessity and proportionality sensu 
stricto, respectively.184 A similar view maintains that subsidiarity takes into consideration 
elements of proportionality—the necessity of action at the EU level—‘without exhausting the 
content of the proportionality principle’. 185  
A more complex understanding of the middle position is provided by Lenaerts, who 
maintains that subsidiarity can be understood both in sensu stricto (the ‘if’ question) and lato 
sensu (the ‘in so far as’ question) terms.186 Subsidiarity lato sensu does involve a 
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proportionality assessment, which, according to Lenaerts, implies that two expressions of the 
proportionality principle are at stake in Article 3b EC, current Article 5(3) TEU.187 The use of 
‘and in so far as’ with regard to EU action, both in the first version of the subsidiarity formula 
of the Maastricht Treaty and in its current Lisbon version, ‘indicates the permissible extent of 
such action’ and ‘makes it difficult to distinguish sharply between subsidiarity and 
proportionality’.188 Yet, while the proportionality test involved in subsidiarity questions 
concerns only shared competences, the proportionality principle in general refers to all types 
of competence. In addition, the proportionality aspect involved in subsidiarity protects 
specifically the sovereignty of Member States, whereas the general proportionality principle 
applies to values protected under EU law.189 
Against the overview of possible stances on the mutual relationship between principles 
expressed by the legal scholarship, Schütze’s understanding of Article 5 TEU presents a 
systematised approach to all three principles. In his approach, the conferral question is a 
‘general “whether” of Union action’ that is answered by the policy area as a whole.190 In other 
words, the competence question asks whether the EU can generally act in any given area. In 
contrast, the focus of subsidiarity is on a specific act at stake. Furthermore, Schütze ties 
together subsidiarity’s ‘whether’ question and proportionality’s ‘how’ question, arguing that 
together they imply that subsidiarity has to be understood as ‘federal proportionality’.191 
Similar to Lenaerts, cited above, Schütze maintains that the distinction between these principles 
lies in the issues that they protect: the private rights of an individual in cases of proportionality 
and the ‘collective autonomy’ of a group under subsidiarity.192 Proportionality should then be 
restricted to safeguarding private rights against excessive public interference.193 Hence, the 
relevant content of Article 5 TEU can be summarised as follows: ‘the enumeration principle 
will tell us whether the Community can act within a policy field. The subsidiarity principle 
would examine whether a European law disproportionately restricts national autonomy; and 
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the principle of proportionality would, finally, tell us whether a European law unnecessarily 
interfered with liberal values’.194  
V. Subsidiarity in the Court of Justice 
A. The Limits of CJEU Jurisprudence on the Subsidiarity Principle 
Subsidiarity is clearly legally binding, and it remains under the judicial control of the CJEU.195 
After the introduction of subsidiarity into the Maastricht Treaty, scholars expected an overflow 
of litigation on the new principle.196 But already it was expected that the Court would not 
conduct a subsidiarity check ‘any further than is absolutely necessary for ensuring and 
respecting the Rule of Law’.197 After Maastricht, only a handful of subsidiarity challenges were 
brought before the Court, and this trend has continued under the expanded subsidiarity regime 
following the Lisbon Treaty.198 Overall, in its jurisprudence the Court has limited its scrutiny 
of the reasoning of the Commission on subsidiarity matters and indeed in no case to date has 
the Court found a violation of subsidiarity. 
The first reason for the Court’s restraint lies in subsidiarity’s being ‘political in nature’.199 
As a result, its enforcement must arguably remain within the purview of political institutions, 
and this limits the ability of the Court to apply a high level of legal scrutiny.200 Others have 
argued that subsidiarity is both a legal and a political principle.201 For example, Schütze talks 
about the political and the judicial nature of subsidiarity, with only the latter concerning its 
‘substantiation’ before the Court.202 The Court itself in Tobacco Products Directive litigation 
clearly distinguished that the initial, political review of subsidiarity is in the hands of national 
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parliaments, while the Court has to decide whether the EU legislature ‘was entitled to consider, 
on the basis of a detailed statement, that the objective of the proposed action cannot be better 
achieved at EU level’.203 
A second, related reason for the limited judicial scrutiny lies in the character of the 
subsidiarity principle as a ‘catch-all formula of good government and common sense, rather 
than a well-defined political or philosophical principle’, and without ‘clear legal content’.204 
The ‘bipolar ethos’ inherent in the subsidiarity principle, specifically the preservation of 
national autonomy and comparative efficiency of centralisation, explains the adherence of the 
Court to the separation of powers: the Court has tried to avoid ‘substituting its own judgment 
for that of the institutions, in assessing a choice which was ultimately perceived as political’.205 
A third possible explanation is the political agenda of the Court guided by the ‘idea of 
integration’, which may be endangered by the ‘anti-integration’ character of the subsidiarity 
principle, directed specifically against the growth of EU competences.206 Finally, if Member 
States adopted a legislative act via qualitative majority voting, the adoption decision implied 
that there were enough Member States that thought a given EU action fulfilled the subsidiarity 
test, rendering judicial review superfluous.207 Some commentators now urge the Court to insist 
‘more sternly on transparency and reason-giving in support of legislative choices made’208 and 
to give up on the manifest-error doctrine by adopting a ‘doctrinal framework’ for subsidiarity 
and proportionality.209  
Overall, the common view is that the CJEU did not become an effective guardian of 
subsidiarity.210 Its vague pronunciations of subsidiarity compliance provided drafting 
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instructions for EU institutions, and in consequence made it harder for the Court to annul such 
a legislative act over subsidiarity issues in the future.211 
The broadening of EU competences and the extension of majoritarian decision-making in 
the Lisbon Treaty arguably put the Court under much stricter public scrutiny.212 In 
consequence, the Court is expected to increase its control over the exercise of competences by 
the EU and advance a counter-majoritarian approach when reviewing EU legislation.213 The 
fact that the CJEU has never declared an EU act as violating subsidiarity should not have a 
deterrent effect on bringing cases before the Court.214  
B. Post-Lisbon Subsidiarity Case Law 
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Court has considered subsidiarity only in a 
small number of CJEU cases.215 The few available judgments point to two trends in the Court’s 
analysis of subsidiarity: (i) the significance of the cross-border nature of a proposal in justifying 
EU action, and (ii) the need to substantiate compliance with the subsidiarity principle through 
evidence and, in particular, the use of impact assessments for the analysis of the subsidiarity 
question. These trends emphasise two aspects of subsidiarity in the Treaties, as discussed 
previously. 
The first aspect in the subsidiarity case law is the cross-border test in instances concerning 
the internal market, for which an almost automatic prejudice for EU action appears to apply. 
The Amsterdam Protocol indicated this test as a guideline to justify action at the EU level: the 
issue at stake has transnational aspects that cannot be regulated satisfactorily at the national 
level.216 According to Advocate General (AG) Maduro in the Vodafone case, action should be 
taken at the EU level whenever the EU has ‘a special interest in protecting and promoting 
economic activities of a cross-border character’ and ‘the national democratic process is likely 
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to fail to protect cross-border activities’.217 That was the case with the roaming retail prices in 
the Vodafone litigation. Generally speaking, the EU should take action in cases in which there 
is a transnational dimension of an issue that national process may fail to regulate and that will, 
in turn, increase the added value of EU legislative intervention.218 In its decision, the Court did 
not repeat this argument, but simply referred to the regulation’s objective ‘to contribute to the 
smooth functioning of the internal market’.219 
The case law concerning the Tobacco Products Directive highlights issues arising with 
subsidiarity scrutiny when the objective of an EU act concerns the functioning of the internal 
market based on Article 114 TFEU.220 The new directive was challenged in the CJEU in three 
different proceedings on a number of grounds including the compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle of various aspects of the directive. Specifically, it was contested whether the 
prohibition of menthol cigarettes221 and the new rules on e-cigarettes were compatible with the 
subsidiarity principle.222 AG Kokott,223 conducting the subsidiarity review of the directive, 
analysed both the substance of the EU measure and the statement of reasons.224 With regard to 
the substance of the directive, the AG focused mainly on the cross-border dimension of the 
problem arguing that it is impossible to address at national level.225 The AG’s opinion specified 
that since the aim of Article 114 TFEU is to eliminate obstacles to cross-border trade, ‘as a 
rule’ Member States cannot sufficiently achieve this objective.226 Poland tried to counter this 
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argument by arguing that the issue of menthol-flavoured tobacco does not have a cross-border 
dimension because of diverse consumption patterns and economic structures among the 
Member States and the fact that the biggest markets in this respect (Poland, Slovakia, and 
Finland) can provide for ‘health-related action’ at the national level.227 The AG disagreed with 
this reasoning and pointed out that the objective of the directive is to remove obstacles for the 
trade of tobacco products and simultaneously ensuring a high level of health protection, and 
this can be done only when all characterizing flavours are prohibited.228 Moreover, the AG 
argued that differences in consumption patterns across the Member States do not matter as 
such. The core of the problems are whether there is or will be cross-border trade in this area 
and whether the obstacles can be ‘efficiently’ removed by Member States on their own.229 The 
AG concluded that there exists a ‘lively’ cross-border trade in the tobacco market, with 
differences between Member States on the rules of characterizing flavours, and therefore the 
EU did not commit a manifest error in the assessment of the facts in its appraisal of the question 
of subsidiarity.230  
The Court did not follow in discussing the details of cross-border trade, but, instead, 
focused on the objectives of the directive. It assessed that even if one of the objectives of the 
directive, ensuring a high level of protection of human health, could be better achieved at the 
national level, the other objective, improvement of the functioning of the internal market for 
tobacco, would be shattered if tobacco with characterising flavour would be permitted in some 
Member States and forbidden in others.231 The ‘interdependence’ of those objectives makes 
the EU level better placed to achieve them.232 Moreover, in the view of the Court, the 
subsidiarity principle does not aim to set limits on EU action on the basis of the situation in a 
specific Member State assessed individually, but, instead, simply demands that the action can 
be better achieved at the EU level in view of the objectives of the Treaties.233 The Court rejected 
Poland’s argument that since menthol cigarettes are consumed predominantly in only three 
Member States, the objective of protection of human health could be better achieved at the 
national level. That argument was rejected because, in fact, menthol cigarettes had a market 
share greater than the EU-wide market share in at least eight additional Member States.234 
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The second aspect of the Court’s subsidiarity case law is the relatively recent focus on the 
duty to justify EU action with specific evidence, in particular, the reference to impact 
assessments in that question. This is in contrast to earlier judgements, when the Court’s review 
of the procedural aspects of subsidiarity often required not more than a mention of the reasons 
for the Community to act in the preamble of the proposal.235 The Vodafone case concerning 
roaming charges is seen as the beginning of this trend236 and is the first case in which the Court 
referred to the impact assessment to support the review of the proportionality principle,237 
following up on the similar application of that impact assessment by the AG Maduro.238 The 
AG underlined that the intent of the EU legislator is not enough to show compliance of the act 
with the subsidiarity principle, but that it instead should be required to compare the benefits of 
EU action with the possible problems and the costs of national action.239 
In the subsequent Luxembourg airports case, the Court again referred to the impact 
assessment showing that the Commission pondered a number of options with regard to the 
airport charges that were at stake.240 Moreover, in both the Luxembourg airports and the 
Vodafone cases, the Court referred to the guidelines established by the Amsterdam Protocol 
when deciding on the compatibility of the regulation at stake with the subsidiarity principle.241 
However, it is notable that the Court did not demand that each of the provisions of the directive 
have a separate subsidiarity justification.242 
Finally, before the Tobacco Products Directive case, there remained cases in which the 
Court appeared to be more lenient. For example, in the VAT case, the Court was once more 
satisfied with a mere recital in the preamble of the directive, stating that its objective of 
harmonisation of VAT systems of the Member States can be better achieved at the EU level.243 
The Tobacco Products Directive litigation finally provided a more elaborate inquiry into 
procedural subsidiarity, again referencing the evidence in the impact assessment. The preamble 
of the directive in that case contained the classic subsidiarity justification,244 but the impact 
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assessment provided an explicit subsidiarity justification covering one page. 245 In it, the 
Commission points out how the different national approaches to tobacco limit the functioning 
of the internal market and argues that the directive would produce ‘clear benefits’. These drew 
on the more detailed analysis and comparison of the effects of doing nothing and pursuing 
different options. 
AG Kokott assessed the procedural subsidiarity angle since Poland claimed that the 
Commission’s directive lacks sufficient subsidiarity justification, more specifically that only 
one recital of the directive’s preamble deals with subsidiarity.246 The AG confirmed that the 
directive only reproduces the text of Article 5(3) TEU.247 Despite this ‘empty formula’ used by 
the EU legislator, the AG found that other recitals in the preamble, even though they do not 
directly reference subsidiarity, but, rather, justify the use of Article 114 TFEU, are nonetheless 
relevant to the subsidiarity question because of the overlap in the reasoning applicable to 
internal market and subsidiarity provisions.248 Moreover, the AG underlined that the 
explanatory memorandum in the Commission proposal and the impact assessment discussed 
the insufficiency of national rules and the added value of EU action and that both were available 
to EU institutions and national parliaments in the legislative procedure.249 The AG advised the 
EU legislature to avoid ‘empty formulas’ and substantiate the preamble with regard to the 
subsidiarity principle in future legislative acts, but she did not find a violation of the procedural 
aspect of the subsidiarity principle.250  
Moreover, when assessing the ‘added value’ of EU action,251 the AG pointed out that 
although it might be an ‘automatic’ case with regard to Article 114 TFEU legislation, it still 
demanded a quantitative and qualitative test.252 The AG established that the market at stake has 
a ‘substantial trade volume and affects the lives of millions of Union citizens every day’ 
(‘quantitative test’) and that the issue at stake is ‘beyond national boundaries’, confirming a 
common European interest (‘qualitative test’).253 Again, the AG found no manifest error of 
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assessment in the Commission’s reasoning and argued that the directive therefore also passed 
the positive aspect of the subsidiarity test.254  
The Court decision focussed less on the details of the quantitative and qualitative test, but 
instead highlighted the availability of information in the Commission documents. It conducted 
its assessment ‘not only by reference to the wording of the contested act, but also by reference 
to its context and the circumstances of the individual case’: both the proposal and the impact 
assessment have provided ‘sufficient information’ pointing out ‘clearly and unequivocally’ the 
benefits of EU action.255 Moreover, since Poland participated in the legislative procedure, it 
cannot raise an argument that it did not know the reasoning behind the measures intended by 
the EU legislature.256 In addition, when assessing the proportionality of the prohibition of 
mentholated tobacco, the Court considered another aspect of Article 5 of Protocol No. 2 that 
sets the procedural requirements for EU acts, namely, the need to take into account that any 
burden upon the economic operators should be minimised and commensurate with the sought 
objective. The lost jobs and revenue due to the prohibition were mitigated, in the view of the 
Court, by giving the industry and consumers until 2020 to adapt and by showing in the impact 
assessment that the ban will decrease the number of smokers.257 
In summary, the recent judgements of the CJEU indicate that compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle may derive almost automatically from the cross-border nature of a 
proposal at hand, for example, to achieve the objective of internal market integration. However, 
in making this case, as with other arguments, the Commission will likely be expected to go 
beyond the empty formulas found in recitals of previous legislation and provide specific 
evidence such as the cost–benefit analysis found in supporting impact assessments in order to 
satisfy the procedural requirements of the subsidiarity principle. As such, the subsidiarity 
jurisprudence of the Court did not change substantially since its early pronouncements on the 
issue. It remains to be seen whether the Court will sharpen its inquiry into the procedural aspect 
of subsidiarity.258  
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C. Subsidiarity Action 
Finally, a new source of subsidiarity focus in the Court might be connected to the 
subsidiarity requests coming from national parliaments, according to Article 8 of Protocol No. 
2.259 The Court is competent ‘in actions on ground of infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 263 
[TFEU] by Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf 
of their national Parliament or a chamber thereof’. However, Article 8 of Protocol No. 2 did 
not grant national parliaments independent standing before the ECJ; as a category, national 
parliaments can be seen as ‘indirect semi-privileged applicants’.260 Since the ex post 
subsidiarity review procedure has not yet been applied, it is difficult to predict whether and 
how it will be enforced. The question remains whether national parliaments should have gained 
an independent standing before the Court. In favour of giving national parliaments independent 
standing before the Court are ‘the periodic failings of national executives to reflect the concerns 
of national Parliaments in Council negotiations’.261 In fact, an argument could be made that, 
already, the national design of the rules on subsidiarity action sometimes allows national 
parliaments a lot of independence in the subsidiarity action.262 The involvement of national 
parliaments in the subsidiarity action may thus create a chance for some new subsidiarity case 
law.  
VI. Reasons for Introduction of the EWS 
The EWS was seen as a way to satisfy both federal and democratic safeguards within the EU.263 
National parliaments could act as a safeguard on EU institutions in checking if such institutions 
comply with the subsidiarity principle, and at the same time they could provide democratic 
input. 
A. Competence Creep 
The decision to grant national parliaments the power to control the subsidiarity principle was 
connected with the EU Member States’ dissatisfaction with the Court’s case law on subsidiarity 
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and seen as a palliative against ‘competence creep’.264 The phenomenon of ‘competence creep’, 
the situation in which the scope of action taken by the EU has tended to ‘creep’ outwards 
beyond that foreseen by the Treaty was in particular connected to the broad framing of the 
current Articles 114 TFEU and 352 TFEU. 265 In consequence, a clearer delimitation of EU 
competence became part of the agenda after the Treaty of Nice.266 The Laeken Declaration on 
the Future of the European Union urged a ‘better division and definition of competence in the 
European Union’.267  
B. Democratic Deficit 
The other reason for involving national parliaments directly was the perception that 
‘[d]emocracy was not part of the original DNA of European Integration’268 and that the 
‘democracy issue’ of the EU is that EU institutions suffer from a legitimacy crisis.269 The EU’s 
democratic deficit is to be understood in the light of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy that are 
two ‘legitimizing beliefs’ for the exercise of governing authority.270 Input-oriented legitimacy 
means that ‘political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the “will of the people” 
– that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a 
community’.271 Under output-oriented legitimacy, ‘political choices are legitimate if and 
because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question’.272 
Viewed from this perspective, the transfer of competence from the national level to the EU 
level within the process of European integration raised the question of the legitimisation of EU 
authorities and laws and about the EU’s input and output legitimacy. 
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The transfer of power expresses the idea that competences that used to be exercised at the 
national level have ‘disappeared’.273 While at the Member State level, the law is enacted by 
democratically elected parliaments, the European level is perceived by EU citizens as not 
having the same democratic legitimacy. With the transfer of power, however, the legislative 
process at the EU level has strengthened the position of governments ‘by making the statal 
executive branch the ultimate legislator in the Community’.274 In addition, the scrutiny of 
governmental decisions at EU level remains a national process, one aimed at holding into 
account national actors.275 This creates an input legitimacy deficit. A parallel transfer of 
democratic legitimacy has not accompanied the transfer of competences; the EU level has not 
received more legitimacy. National parliaments ‘appear[ed] as the net losers in the new 
institutional equilibrium resulting from EC membership’.276 Two attempts have been made to 
solve the EU’s ‘democratic issue’; the first centred on the European Parliament (EP), the 
second on national parliaments.  
The first of the attempts has been to increase the role of the directly elected EP in the 
legislative process. Indeed, the EP ‘emerged as a winner in the Lisbon Treaty’ as a result of the 
extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, whereby decisions are taken jointly by the EP 
and the Council, and the conferral of more control over the appointment of the President of the 
EU Commission.277 Those claiming the second-order character of EP elections (a well-known 
claim of Reif and Schmitt is that EP elections have the character of a protest vote against 
governments in power and that the electoral turnout is lower each time) might also have 
softened their views after the 2014 EP elections.278 The elections’ outcomes279 show that 
‘traditional left-right and pro-anti-European integration counterbalanced the traditional 
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determination to punish national governments’, proving some politicisation of these 
elections.280  
The second attempt to strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy was the reinforcement 
of the role of the national parliaments within the European legislative process. This approach 
was grounded in the diagnosis of a ‘democratic disconnect’ of the EU supranational 
institutions, limiting the EU’s legitimacy. Contrary to the idea of the ‘democratic deficit’, 
which applies to the EU institutions per se, the ‘disconnect’ arises from the assertion that it is 
the national level that ultimately carries legitimacy for cultural and historical reasons, and 
without more involvement of national parliaments, the EU remains disconnected from this 
source of legitimacy.281 As a consequence, democratization efforts should focus on the linkages 
between EU institutions’ producing norms and the democratically legitimised national level 
that oversees and controls them, in contrast to a ‘democratic deficit’ perspective that 
concentrates solely on the democratization of EU institutions, independent from the national 
level.282  
The core element in the process of reconnecting the EU with national parliaments was the 
EWS, and this avenue of reform, and not the changes in the position of the EP, will be the focus 
of this book. Declaration No. 23, annexed to the Nice Treaty, first invited national parliaments 
to participate in the debate on the future of the EU. Next, the European Council, meeting in 
Laeken on 15 December 2001, adopted a Declaration on the Future of the European Union that 
pointed towards a new role for national parliaments.283 Specifically, under the heading of 
‘better division and definition of competence in the European Union’, the Declaration asked 
the question of ‘how is the principle of subsidiarity to be applied here?’, also making sure that 
a new division of competences would not cause a ‘creeping expansion of the competence of 
the Union’ or encroach upon the exclusive competences of Member States or regions.284 In the 
section on democracy, transparency, and efficiency in the EU, the Declaration posed questions 
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about the role of national parliaments, namely, whether they should be represented in a new 
institution and whether they should concentrate on the question of division of competences 
between the EU and the Member States. As an example of this function, the Declaration put 
forward an idea of a preliminary check concerning compliance with the subsidiarity 
principle.285 To answer these and other questions, the European Council decided to convene 
the Convention on the Future of Europe.286  
C. Alternative Proposals 
The Convention set to deal with both the issue of ‘competence creep’ and the issue of the 
‘democratic deficit’. Following the indications of the Laeken Declaration, the Convention 
established two separate working groups, one dedicated to the subsidiarity principle (Working 
Group I) and one to the role of national parliaments (Working Group IV). 
Working Group I discussed a number of institutional ideas for the protection of the 
subsidiarity principle. The ‘political monitoring’ possibilities studied by Working Group I 
included the creation of ‘a Mr (or Ms) “subsidiarity” to assist each member of the European 
Council and the European Parliament, with verifying and giving a timely opinion on the 
compliance of proposals the principle of subsidiarity’.287 At a later stage, a position of a ‘Mr 
(or Ms) subsidiarity’ within the Commission, or of a Vice-President of the Commission, 
ensuring the compliance of proposals with subsidiarity, was discussed.288 In this case, it was 
decided, however, that every Commissioner should be responsible for compliance with the 
subsidiarity principle in the areas under his or her competence, in addition to the Commission’s 
own competence to decide on its internal organisation.289 Another option was the creation of 
an ad hoc institution consisting of national parliamentary representatives, a proposal which, 
however, at later stages of the debates, was perceived rather negatively.290 The creation of an 
ad hoc body was ruled out as too cumbersome for the decision-making process.291  
The ‘legal monitoring’ options included the creation of an ad hoc ‘subsidiarity chamber’ 
within the CJEU.292 However, Working Group I concluded that the Court could take such an 
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organisational measure itself.293 Moreover, Working Group I also pondered establishing an ex 
ante judicial mechanism, between the adoption of the EU legislative act and its entry into force, 
inspired by provisions of the Member States for monitoring the constitutionality of laws.294 In 
fact, the vision of creating a Constitutional Council for the Community as an equivalent to the 
French Conseil Constitutionnel had been proposed much earlier. Such a constitutional council 
‘would have jurisdiction only over issues of competences (including subsidiarity) and would 
decide cases submitted to it after a law was adopted, but before coming into force’.295 Their 
project put forward that any Community institution, Member State, or the majority of EP could 
bring such an action. The constitutional council would consist of the president of the CJEU and 
members of Member States’ constitutional courts. However, Working Group I abandoned the 
idea of a constitutional council, as in the view of the group, the introduction of a judicial review 
during the legislative phase would lead to the loss of the political nature of the subsidiarity 
review.296 In addition, granting such powers was perceived as problematic, as the CJEU would 
control subsidiarity at a different stage than conferral or proportionality principles.297 
None of the ideas above has been given a ‘green light’. Both working groups concluded 
that national parliaments should be granted a competence to review the subsidiarity 
principle.298 Working Group I offered three guidelines on the control of the subsidiarity 
principle. First, EU institutions should reinforce their scrutiny of the subsidiarity principle 
during the drafting and examination of proposals. Second, an ‘early warning system’, with a 
role for national parliaments, should be created; and third, an opportunity for ex-post referral 
to the Court of Justice on subsidiarity issues should be provided.299 It was thus proposed, in 
agreement with Working Group IV, that national parliaments would be involved in the EU 
legislative procedure ‘for the first time in the history of European construction’ through a 
process of monitoring of the subsidiarity principle.300 While putting all national parliaments on 
an ‘equal footing’, the system did not make the procedure more cumbersome and did not create 
any new bureaucracy.301 Both the EWS and the possibility to bring a subsidiarity action before 
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the Court were seen as a ‘process-based approach’ in contrast to creation of a new institution.302 
The enhanced involvement of national parliaments was seen as a way to strengthen the EU’s 
democratic legitimacy and ‘bring it closer to the citizens’.303  
The EWS was finally introduced by the Lisbon Treaty after the failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty. The subsidiarity review places itself between the national level and the EU level, 
allowing national parliaments to contribute to the EU constitutional order, not confining their 
role to the national level, as in the case of scrutiny of the government in EU affairs, but 
broadening it to the EU arena. In this sense, the subsidiarity review also avoids identifying the 
democratic deficit in only one institution (eg, the Council) and transferring the decision-making 
to an alternative institution (eg, the EP). In contrast, improving only the national level as a 
point of reference could have been perceived as unsatisfactory, because the democratic deficit 
may also affect the Member States themselves (eg, as they often also do not fulfil the 
‘democratic and constitutional ideals of full representation and participation’).304  
For its purpose as a democratic safeguard, the subsidiarity review provides for an 
interaction between national parliaments and EU institutions, predominantly the Commission. 
The legislative act created in this process captures the involvement of the national and 
European polity. To tackle the ‘competence creep’ within the EU, the EWS offers checks on 
any tendency of the EU to take shared competences away from the Member States. 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to offer an analysis of the subsidiarity principle. This principle was 
provided already in the papal encyclical and in German federalism and liberalism. As a 
constitutional principle, subsidiarity was found first in German Basic Law. The study of 
subsidiarity in Switzerland and the US, as the question central to the organisation of federal 
systems, has shown that the degree to which other systems rely on that principle varies 
significantly. Nonetheless, subsidiarity was then taken as a role model by the EU legal order, 
first in the Maastricht Treaty and then in the Lisbon Treaty. The guidelines for the application 
of the subsidiarity principle established in the ‘Overall Approach’ and in the Amsterdam 
Protocol attempted to provide tangible contours to the ‘national insufficiency’ and the 
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‘comparative efficiency’ tests. In fact, they provide assistance in the enforcement of that 
principle for EU institutions and national parliaments alike. The most promising have, 
however, been the impact assessments and other tools of procedural subsidiarity. They offer 
help in avoiding the ‘empty formulas’ in the justification of compliance of EU legislative 
proposals and adopted acts with the subsidiarity principle. This chapter has also discussed the 
relationship between this principle and the principles of conferral and proportionality. The 
structure of Article 5(3) TEU analysed here is important for the boundaries of the review of 
the subsidiarity principle by the national parliaments, discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Yet, 
before the focus of this book became national parliaments, this chapter offered a recap of the 
flaws in the subsidiarity case law of the Court already established in the relevant literature. 
Additionally, this chapter pointed out some new tendencies in the jurisprudence of the Court 
such as the focus on the cross-border elements of EU action and the reference to impact 
assessments. The ‘subsidiarity action’ enshrined in Protocol No. 2 might offer a new source of 
subsidiarity case law in future. Nonetheless, as such, the subsidiarity jurisprudence of the 
Court, which is so often criticised for not taking subsidiarity seriously, did not seem to have 
changed substantially. This aspect, together with the problem of broadening the EU 
competence and the insufficient democratic legitimacy of the EU actions, in light of the lack 
of another suitable mechanism to answer to those critical points, led to the establishment of the 
EWS, to be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
